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WHEN DO WOMEN MAKE A BETTER TABLE? EXAMINING THE 
INFLUENCE OF WOMEN DIRECTORS ON FAMILY FIRM’S CORPORATE 
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE  
Abstract 
Our paper seeks to further understand the influence of gender board diversity on firms’ 
corporate social performance (CPS) in the context of publicly-held family firms. 
Grounded on corporate governance and family firm literature, we argue that the influence 
of women directors on CSP will be contingent on their relative power and legitimacy 
within the board, and that such dynamics are particularly important in family firm 
boardrooms. Our empirical results show that increases in CSP associated to the presence 
of women in the boards of family firms are due mainly to the presence of outsider non-
family and insider family women directors. Implications for the theory of family firms 
are discussed. 
Cristina Cruz, Rachida Justo, Martín Larraza-Kintana
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mirroring its increasing prevalence and visibility within corporations (Wang et al., 2016), 
research about corporate social responsibility (CSR) has grown significantly during the 
last two decades (Aguinis and Galvas, 2012). Most of the research on this subject has 
explored the connection between CSR and corporate financial performance (Rowley & 
Berman, 2000), revealing that the link between the two is uncertain at best (Peloza, 2009). 
Given the elusiveness of a firm’s instrumental motivation as a predictor of CSR, scholars 
are increasingly searching for alternative explanations to account for why some firms are 
more eager to adopt social practices than others, that is to say, why some firms have 
higher corporate social performance (CSP). Among the factors identified, research has 
recently emphasized the pivotal role of female directors (Rao and Tilt, 2016), given the 
growing normative movement towards gender diversity on boards of directors (e.g. 
European Commission, 2010), and the extant evidence showing that female directors tend 
to exhibit a special sensitivity towards social issues such as CSR (Boulouta, 2013).  
Despite some important progress, evidence regarding the influence of gender diversity on 
CSP has been somewhat inconclusive (Rao and Tilt, 2016). In addition, existing literature 
on the subject often relies on a debatable premise, which is that all female directors 
possess the same level of influence on a firm’s strategy. Yet, evidence shows that it is 
unlikely that boards can consistently and uniformly leverage female directors’ 
contributions (Terjesen and Sealy, 2016). Previous studies on board diversity show that 
female directors’ power, or their ability to exercise their will (Filkenstein, 1992), is 
contingent on the political context in which the board operates. Further, because women 
on corporate boards are still relatively rare, their legitimacy as directors is often 
challenged (Elstad and Ladegard, 2010). Hence, female directors’ power and legitimacy 
to influence boards seems to represent a missing piece in the narrative around firms’ CSP. 
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Our research aims to address this gap by uncovering the different categories of female 
directors and their corresponding influence on pushing the CSR agenda and improve the 
firm´s CSP. Building upon corporate governance literature on board composition 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) and executive power (Finkelstein, 1992), we argue that 
women’s leverage regarding CSR depends upon their relative legitimacy and power to 
influence decision-making in the boardroom.  
We focus specifically upon family firms, which represent an ideal context to investigate 
this relationship for two main reasons. First, the impact of family ownership on CSP is 
still open to debate. Many argue that the non-economic rationales that drive family 
owners’ decision-making lead them to enact socially responsible behaviors (Berrone et 
al., 2010). Others suggest that family firms are heterogeneous in their social orientations 
(Cruz et al., 2014). Family firms therefore appear to offer a suitable setting for examining 
the boundary conditions that are conducive to higher levels of CSP. In this sense, it is 
worth noting that while family scholars have followed the broader trend in management 
literature by paying increasing attention to heterogeneity in CSR actions among family 
firms (Cruz et al., 2014), the role of female directors in this process has been largely 
ignored. Second, the presence of the owning family has important implications for board 
composition (Bammens et al, 2011). While the CSR literature distinguishes between the 
role of outsiders and insiders in improving the firm CSP, it has not yet considered how 
family affiliation may influence that relationship for board members in general and 
female directors in particular (Singh et al., 2015). Our claim is that while female directors 
will tend to favor family firms’ CSP, their ultimate influence will be contingent on 
whether their appointment is viewed as legitimate and the level of power they hold on the 
board. We posit that women’s insider-outsider character, coupled with their status as a 
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family or non-family member, affects their relative legitimacy and power on the board 
and therefore their ability to push a CSR agenda. 
Our analyses of the CSR activities of a sample of publicly held United States family firms 
over the 2008-2012 period confirm our expectations. Specifically, we observe that it is 
the presence of women non-family outsider directors and women family insider directors 
that results in a significant increase in the firm CSP. On the contrary, female directors 
who are family outsiders or non-family insiders do not seem to influence CSP. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, the article is among the first 
to consider the role of female directors in the theory of family firms. Women have long 
been identified as central actors in controlling families (Martinez-Jimenez, 2009) but their 
influence has tended to be limited to the family sphere (Cesaroni & Sentuti, 2014). In this 
sense, our paper contributes to the widely articulated call for incorporating gender 
considerations as a means of enhancing our understanding of family business dynamics 
(Martinez-Jimenez, 2009). In so doing, it also contributes to the burgeoning body of 
literature examining the influence of female directors on the CSR activities of family 
firms (Rodriguez-Ariza et al., 2017). While extant research analyzes the connection 
between family ownership and CSR (Cruz et al., 2014), the role played by female 
directors in fostering CSR activities in family firms has yet to be explored. 
Second, our study heeds early calls from corporate governance scholars (e.g. Finkelstein, 
1992) to consider the role of power in the association between the board of directors and 
organizational outcomes. However, these contingent forces have rarely been analyzed. 
We perform such analysis in the context of family firms and reveal the presence of 
distinctive board dynamics (i.e. the female director-controlling family relationship) that 
to date have not been considered in the literature.  
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Third, our study highlights heterogeneity among CSP in family firms. Based on the mixed 
evidence regarding the impact of family ownership on CSR, scholars now caution that 
comparing family and non-family firms’ social orientations may be insufficient to 
attaining an understanding of how family ownership influences a firm’s CSR (Cruz et al., 
2014). In line with these arguments, our study acknowledges the important role of family 
firms’ governance mechanisms as a source of such heterogeneity (Chrisman & Holt, 
2016).  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Board of directors, diversity and CSP 
 
Understanding the organizational factors that predict firms’ CSP is a major topic in CSR 
research (Aguinis and Galvas, 2012). Scholars in this field often highlight the pivotal role 
played by corporate governance antecedents, and in particular, corporate boards of 
directors. Certainly, governance drives managers and executives to set goals and 
objectives pertaining to CSR, and the board is key to meeting and promoting these 
objectives (Jamali et al., 2008). Accordingly, studies have focused on two overarching 
characteristics of boards that positively affect a firm’s CSP: on the one hand, board 
structural diversity, such as board size (Bai, 2013), stakeholder representativeness 
(Hillman et al., 2001) or proportion of outside directors (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013); on the 
other hand, board demographic diversity, such as experience and community influence 
(Bai, 2013) and gender board representation (Boulouta, 2013). 
While relatively recent, the issue of gender diversity in boardrooms, and its corresponding 
role in promoting social and environmental issues, has become a major theme of research 
(Ma, Liang, Yu and Lee, 2012). Through tracing the number and/or percentage of female 
directors, several studies have associated these indicators with outcomes such as 
charitable donations (Wang and Cofffe, 1992) and CSR ratings (Krüger, 2009). The 
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theoretical logic behind these findings is threefold. First, and in line with the resource 
dependence theory, women provide different and non-traditional professional 
experiences and backgrounds (Singh et al., 2008) that enhance decision-making and 
enable the board to better perform its tasks, including CSR tasks. Second, social role 
theory suggests that women are socialized to be more “communal” and compassionate 
than men (Eagly, 2005), and show lower tolerance for ethical compromises (Kennedy and 
Kray, 2013). As a result, the presence of women on corporate boards generates a more 
productive discourse (Bilimoria, 2000) and higher sensitivity and attention to the needs 
of others (Nielsen and Huse, 2010), which enhances CSP. Finally, gender differences in 
values and management style enhance the monitoring capacity of mixed boards (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009), which according to agency theory also reverts positively in CSP. 
Providing further support to these perspectives, it has been noted that stereotypes 
regarding women’s social inclination are often a major reason for women’s nomination 
at boardrooms (Burges and Tharenou, 2002) and assignment to public affairs committees 
or CSR areas (Zelechowski et al., 2006).  
When examining the impact of female directors on corporate boards, prior research has 
generally only accounted for the presence and number of women in the boardrooms. The 
underlying assumption has been that, once appointed as directors women would be 
accorded the legitimacy and authority that goes with the position. This assumption may 
not be valid since according to gender studies, power is essential for women to have an 
impact (Ragins and Sundstrom, 1989). Indeed, research shows that having women on 
boards may be inconsequential unless they also enjoy the power to influence change 
(Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2003). Corporate governance studies also suggest that 
power, or the ability of individuals to exert their will (Finkelstein, 1992), is contingent on 
the political context within which boards operate. Neglecting this context is therefore 
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problematic, since as noted by Boulouta (2013) the role enacted by board members (and 
particularly women) will depend on the kind of structural forces and influences that 
operate on corporate boards.  
In this paper, we argue that such forces are particularly salient in the specific case of 
family firms. This is because the presence of a controlling family, with preferences that 
extend beyond pure economic outcomes (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), provides additional 
complexity to board dynamics and may alter the basis for power and legitimacy within 
the board. Therefore, a proper understanding of the role of women directors in CSP in 
family firms requires a more nuanced theorization of the power and legitimacy of the 
different women directors. We aim to provide such theorization in the following section. 
 
The different basis of power on family firms’ boards 
It is generally recognized that boards of directors in family firms differ from those of non-
family businesses (Bammens et al., 2011). In an attempt to explain this distinction, 
authors illustrate two types of motives. First, given the overlapping of ownership and 
management roles, it is often the case that directors also operate as managers and/or 
owners of the firm (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Second, due to the presence of the owning 
family, which often acts both as the controlling dominant coalition and as a unique 
stakeholder group of the firm, the board of directors in family firms should reflect a 
balance between the interests of the family and those of other key stakeholders for the 
family firm (Bammens et al., 2011). These features of family firms have important 
implications for board composition, since board membership is negotiated based on the 
relative power of family owners (Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma, 1999). This negotiation 
has, in turn, repercussions for directors’ legitimacy and power. 
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In reviewing the literature on corporate governance in family firms, it is apparent that 
board members differ along two main dimensions that are particularly relevant when it 
comes to understanding power and legitimacy. The first is family affiliation. Widely 
considered a key construct in the family firm literature, manager’s family affiliation has 
been associated with several individual-level variables such as idiosyncratic goals, 
appointment and remuneration benefits, as well as a unique ‘right’ to participate in the 
firm’s decision-making processes (Cruz et al., 2010). Indeed, Finkelstein (1992) 
highlights the importance of family affiliation as an antecedent of power in top 
management teams. He states that power that stems from the family can be gained either 
directly by representing shareholders, or indirectly through a director’s often long-term 
interaction with the board, as she translates her unique position into implicit control over 
board members. Building upon this basis, corporate governance literature has also 
considered the impact of family affiliation on director’s influence (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003) 
The second relevant dimension to understanding directors’ power and legitimacy pertains 
to the distinction between insider and outsider directors (respectively, employed or not 
employed by the firm). In the context of CSR, there is a general agreement that the 
presence of outsider directors would positively influence CSP (Johnson and Greening, 
1999). According to agency advocates, outside directors increase the                                    
board´s monitoring role, reducing managerial discretion to engage in socially 
irresponsible decisions. It is also argued that outsiders contribute to align managers’ 
interests with long-term goals for shareholders, which may encourage friendly corporate 
policies towards non-shareholding stakeholders. In addition, resource dependence theory, 
which highlights a board’s resource provision role in the context of CSR, stresses that 
outsiders often contribute a broader range of experience and knowledge, valuable 
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information about other firms’ strategies (McDonald and Westphal, 2010), and 
interactions with external management teams (Mintzberg, 1983). They are also 
instrumental in accounting for stakeholders’ concerns and for reaching out to them 
(Clarkson, 1995).  
Considering these two main dimensions (family affiliation and insider-outsider status), 
directors in family firms can belong to one of the four following category types: family 
insider, non-family insider, family outsider and non-family outsider. These classes have 
distinctive ramifications for directors’ abilities to influence board decisions in family 
firms. Interestingly, only a handful of family business studies explicitly distinguish 
among directors’ typologies (Fiegener et al., 2000), and none of these consider gender 
diversity. As a result, the role of different types of female directors in influencing family 
firm outcomes is unknown. This oversight is particularly significant when examining 
CSR practices, because although the corporate governance literature acknowledges the 
differential influence of insider and outsider directors in CSP (Johnson and Greening, 
1999), it assumes an unequivocal positive relationship in the case of female directors 
regardless of their role on the board. Furthermore, while family business studies show 
that family involvement on boards and within top management teams influences CSP in 
family firms, the literature is silent on the differential impact of types of directors on the 
social orientation of this firm.  
In order to further our understandings of these issues, we argue in the subsequent section 
that in the case of family firms, the combined effect of female director family affiliation 
as well their insider/outsider status will determine their relative legitimacy and power to 
influence board decisions and favor CSR activities. Prior to this, we start establishing as 
our baseline assumption that the presence of women on the boards of directors of family 
firms would be correlated with an increase in the firm’s CSP. 
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
As noted, existing literature has stressed the positive influence of female directors on a 
firm’s CSP (Boulouta, 2013). Female directors enhance board diversity and, consistent 
with the propositions of social role theory, tend to exhibit a preference for greater social 
activity. Studies of gender stereotypes have associated women with altruistic and 
community-oriented attitudes (e.g. Gilligan, 1982), many of which represent guiding 
principles related to CSR (Shafer et al., 2007). In the field of management, these qualities 
have often been used to justify female directors’ pro-CSR behavior (e.g. Zhang, Zhu and 
Ding, 2013). This research suggests that complying with prescriptive gender stereotypes, 
female directors tend to demonstrate a special sensitivity towards social issues such as 
CSR (Boulouta, 2013).  
We do not expect this general gender-related preference to change with the family 
affiliation of the director. Indeed, family and non-family female directors should, all 
things being equal, show a preference for CSR activities. However, it is feasible that not 
all female directors possess the same power and legitimacy to push a CSR agenda that 
fits their preferences. In the following section, and based on our typology of female 
directors, we set a rationale to understand which categories are better able to push the 
CSR agenda and improve a firm’s CSP. 
Family ownership and its impact on female directors’ power and legitimacy   
According to our previous discussion, and all things being equal, we argue that a female 
director who is affiliated to the owning family should be more powerful than a manager 
without such a base of control. When combined with legitimacy considerations, however, 
the net impact of family affiliation is less straightforward. First, and of particular 
relevance to the scope of our paper, is the fact that family members are often appointed 
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in management positions regardless of their professional qualifications or fitness for the 
job (Schulze et al., 2001). While this permits preservation of the family’s SEW, it also 
poses legitimacy concerns for the appointed family members vis-à-vis other employees, 
especially those outside of the family (Gomez-Mejia at al., 2007). This pattern may also 
exist on boards. For example, recent investigations of top French companies emphasize 
the link between the proportion of women on French corporate boards and family 
affiliation (Singh et al., 2015). In the absence of unique personal assets to justify their 
appointment on the board, female directors with strong ties to owning/founding families 
might be deemed token women. In other words, women appointed to corporate boards 
who are perceived as symbolic members or mere family representatives run the risk of 
having their legitimacy as directors questioned. Hence, while the preference for these 
women might be better aligned with the alternative of greater CSR, we argue that they 
will not be sufficiently influential to move the whole board towards that end. 
This is not the case for family directors who are also insiders. Contrary to female family 
directors who are outsiders, those who are insiders enjoy a natural legitimacy since their 
skills are certified by the functional role they hold within the firm and their deep 
knowledge of the company’s inner functioning. This enables them to undertake their 
board work without criticism that they are only there because they are affiliated to the 
family. Holding a formal organizational position also accords female directors structural 
power. As expressed by Finkelstein (1992: 509): “Managers who have a legislative right 
to exert influence are influential.” 
In sum, we posit that by combining the power and legitimacy that stems from their dual 
standing as family owners and firm managers, female directors who are family insiders 
will exhibit a certain influence on board members. As such, they will be able to enact 
their gender role and push the board’s CSR agenda. It follows that a family firm with a 
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high proportion of female directors who can be classified within this category should 
demonstrate a comparatively higher CSP. Formally stated:  
Hypothesis 1 ‘The higher the percentage of family female directors who are insiders, the 
higher the family firm’s CSP.’ 
 
Non-family female directors and the importance of independence 
Although family directors may represent a sizable proportion of women on a family firm’s 
board, the majority of women in listed family firms tend to be unaffiliated to ownership 
(Singh et al., 2015). Non-family insiders and non-family outsiders fall into this broad 
category. Could these female directors enjoy any influence in the absence of ownership 
power? We now posit that this is possible in the case of non-family outsider women. 
We first draw on the literature concerning top management team power (Finkelstein, 
1992), which establishes that in addition to structural and ownership power, top managers 
can derive power from two other sources: expertise and prestige. Expert power stems 
from knowledge of how to perform the diverse tasks that may be essential for the 
organization. Prestige power emanates from personal prestige or status. As experts in their 
particular domain, and as sources of external prestige and reputation for the family firm, 
the views of a female director who is an outsider are perceived as more legitimate, and 
her voice becomes that of an influential director, rather than of a representative of a 
particular demographic group, i.e. women. 
In addition, the resource-dependence approach distinguishes between the types of 
resources brought to the board by insider and outsider directors (e.g. Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990). While insider directors may have greater incentives to provide 
resources to the firm, outsiders are valued for their experience and ability to make 
important decisions (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Because of their wider diversity of 
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backgrounds, outsider board members are more likely than insider directors to define 
organizational performance beyond financial terms (Zahra et al., 1993), placing them 
closer to the objectives of CSR. Consistent with this perspective is the fact that the 
evidence indicates that outsider board members will exhibit greater concern for society’s 
demands (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995) and that the percentage of outside directors is 
positively associated with high corporate social responsibility (Zahra et al., 1993; Zhang 
et al, 2013). 
Also, the corporate governance literature has used agency arguments to claim that 
outsider directors hold more power and are better positioned to defend their own views 
and preferences even against CEOs or owners who hold opposite views in firm affairs. 
(Baysinger and Hossikison, 1990). This is particularly important when it comes to CSR 
in family firms. As shown by previous literature (Rodriguez-Ariza et al., 2017) 
controlling families in family firms may be reluctant to pursue a pro-social agenda, 
particularly in the internal dimensions of CSR. Furthermore, as managers of the family 
firm, non-family insider directors face greater risks and accountability for the firm’s 
performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003), which may make them less prone to engage in 
CSR activities with uncertain economic results, at least in the short term (Cruz et al., 
2014). 
Hence, according to these arguments, outsider directors hold more power than insiders 
and are in a superior position to protect the interests of executives and non-shareholding 
stakeholders. In this sense, non-family female directors who are outsiders will gain some 
measure of influence over board members and are therefore better placed to enact their 
role as proponents and defenders of a more active CSR agenda. Thus, we expect that the 
more non-family female outsider directors who operate on the board, the greater the 
commitment of family firms with CSR. Formally: 
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Hypothesis 2 ‘The higher the percentage of non-family female directors who are 
outsiders, the higher the family firm’s CSP.’ 
 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
We used the list of publicly-held companies in the United States of America that belong 
to the Fortune 1000 during the period 2008-2012, excluding those for which information 
was unavailable in the Compustat database. Following studies on the performance of 
listed firms in general (Fama and French, 1992) and family firms in particular (i.e. 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006), we excluded companies from the financial and government 
sector. This resulted in 616 firm observations. We used Compustat Global as our principal 
source to obtain firm financial information, sector of activity, size and age. Information 
about the presence of independent directors in the board was garnered from the Thompson 
Reuters database. 
We manually inspected each firm’s proxy statement to determine whether or not it 
classified itself as a family firm, as well as the influence of family members in firm 
governance. In some cases, the proxy statement provided explicit information about 
family ownership. Yet for most observations, family ownership was determined as the 
sum of the percentage of shares owned by each individual of the controlling family group, 
either directly or indirectly (most likely through a family trust). In order to identify family 
relationships, we looked for accordance in surnames and also used a number of keywords 
to identify kinship ties between individuals (e.g. father, mother, son, daughter, cousin). 
We adopted the same search strategy to determine the presence of family members on the 
board of directors of family firms, including family female directors.  
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Following standard criteria used in previous studies on publicly traded American family 
companies (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003, Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Berrone et al, 2010), 
we classified the company as a family firm if two criteria were met: a) an individual or a 
family group owned at least 5% of the shares during the whole period,1 and b) at least one 
member of the owning family was on the board of directors. The 5 percent cut-off is 
comparable to prior studies that use this convention for large publicly traded American 
firms, both in the corporate governance literature in general (see review by Tosi et al, 
1999) and in family firm studies (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2007). Adding 
the criteria of identifying at least one family member in the board results in a more 
conservative definition of family firm, but it ensures that the family influences firm 
strategic decision making (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2003).  
Following this process, our final panel consisted of 152 American listed family firms (758 
firm year observations). The manual inspection of proxy statements of each company, 
also allowed us to review information about the board of directors and classify female 
directors according to their role on the board. 
CSP has been collected by the CSRHub database, the world’s largest CSR database, 
which provides social, environmental, community, and governance ratings on 
approximately 7,000 companies from 135 industries in 91 countries. It is also the first 
database that combines data from five of the leading socially responsible investment 
(SRI) analysis firms (also known as Environment, Governance-ESG), and over 120 
influential non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Thus, the data are relatively 
objective, not based solely on self-reported measures and less likely to suffer from social 
desirability biases. CSRHub has recently been utilized in the context of social 
                                                          
1 In line with Villalonga & Amit (2006), we regarded the focal family as the one whose members possessed 
the highest percentage of shares. 
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responsibility, both in academic (Bu, Wagner, and Yu, 2013; Cruz et al., 2014) and 
practitioner environments (Gidawani, 2013).2 
We collected data regarding CSP from 2009 until 2013. In order to guarantee time 
causality, ownership and financial information for a given year were matched with the 
CSRHub rates of the subsequent year. For example, financial and ownership information 
for 2008 were matched with CSRHub rates for 2009. We ended up with five blocks of 
matched data that constituted a balanced 5-year panel (760 observations). 
 
Variable measurement 
Dependent variable: Corporate social performance (CSP) 
While a variety of measurements approaches have been utilized to assess CSR actions, in 
this paper we follow an “objective approach” (Morgeson et al., 2013) and rely on the 
firms´ sustainability ratings released by CSRHub to proxy for firms’ CSP.  
CSRHub is an independent organization (www.csrhub.org) that provides information on 
social performance in over 7,000 companies from 135 industries in 91 countries. The 
CSRHub methodology maps each element of data it receives from a data source into one 
or more subcategories and converts it to a numeric scale from 0 to 100 (100 = positive 
rating). Subsequently, it compares the scores from different data sources for the same 
company and adjusts all the scores from a source to remove bias and create a more 
consistent rating. It finally aggregates these ratings to category level. Four main 
categories became apparent: two related to internal stakeholders (employees and 
governance), and two related to external stakeholders (the environment and community). 
Closer inspection of the governance category shows that CSRHub uses the percentage of 
female directors as one of its metrics to compute the governance score and its inclusion 
                                                          
2 We provide more information about CSRHub rates in the subsection describing the dependent variable 
of the study. 
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as an outcome variable would be likely to produce spurious correlations. Therefore, we 
limited our focus to the employees’ category as our measure for CSP towards internal 
stakeholders. We also decided to focus on the ‘community’ dimension in order to capture 
CSP with external stakeholders, since previous research suggests that as environmental 
sustainability becomes mainstream, pro-environment attitudes are becoming more 
gender-neutral (Hechevarría et al., 2016). We calculated the total CSR performance for 
each company as the sum of the firm’s score in each of the two aforementioned 
dimensions (community and employees). 3 
Independent variables:  
Women on the board. We defined the influence of female directors in terms of the 
percentage of women represented on the board in relation to the board size (Boulouta, 
2013; Amore et al., 2014).  
Women’s roles on the board.  We classified female directors as insiders if they were also 
officers of the firm, and as outsiders if they were non-management board members (Daily 
et al., 1999). Furthermore, we defined them as family directors if they belonged to the 
owning family by using the aforementioned criteria (i.e. coincidence in the individual 
surnames and keywords to identify kinship ties between individuals). In combining the 
two criteria, we distinguished four types of female directors: a) Family insiders are family 
female directors who are also officers in the firm; b) Non-family insiders  are women who 
do not have family ties with the owning family but belong to the executive team of the 
family firm; c) Family outsiders are female board members with family ties but with no 
                                                          
3 The employees category includes disclosure of policies, programs, and performance in diversity, labor 
relations and labor rights, compensation, benefits (including those that engage employees and improve 
worker development), and employee training, health and safety. The community category covers the 
company’s commitment to its local, national and global community. It reflects a company’s citizenship, 
charitable-giving programs, and volunteerism. It also covers a company’s responsibility for the 
development, design, and management of its products and services, and their impacts on customers and 
society at large. It also relates to product safety, quality, and the company’s response to problems with 
safety and quality. 
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executive role in the firm, and d) Non-family outsiders, are female directors who are not 
part of the family and who do not have an executive role in the firm. For each company, 
we aggregated the number of women in each role and computed the percentage of women 
in each category by dividing this number by the size of the board.   
Control variables 
We included several control variables to control for other potential determinants of a 
company’s CSR. We first controlled for firm size, measured a firm´s total assets, since 
larger firms are subjected to closer public scrutiny from media, special interests, and 
stakeholders than smaller ones, thereby raising the likelihood of them acting in more 
socially responsible ways (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). In order to correct for skewness 
in multivariate analyses, we included the logarithm transformation of these total assets. 
We also controlled for firm age in terms of the number of years since the firm’s creation 
and used its logarithm transformation in the multivariate analysis. Finally, we also 
controlled by past firm performance measured in terms of the firm´s ROA. 
We used a continuous family ownership variable to account for the influence of family 
owners in each company. This variable was defined as the voting power of the focal 
family in each of the sampled years. We also controlled for several variables regarding 
the composition of the board, including the percentage of family directors and the 
percentage of independent directors as related to board size. Finally, we included female 
directors’ age and tenure on the board, which may influence their CSR performance. In 
order to ensure consistency with the other analyses (firm level), individual board 
members’ information was aggregated to compute the average per firm.   
 
Estimation methods 
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Firm-specific unobserved variables, i.e. unobserved variables that represent time-
invariant properties of firms (such as managerial ability, or the political context in which 
a firm operates), may affect CSR but are difficult to observe or measure. Traditional panel 
data analysis (such as fixed-effects analysis) might account for such endogeneity under 
certain assumptions (Wooldridge, 2002). However, we could not control for firm fixed 
effects because the extent of family control and the presence of female directors had very 
little variation during the sample period. Accordingly, we ran panel data with random 
effects. Significance tests were computed with robust standard errors clustered by firm to 
account for non-independence of observations and heteroskedasticity. 
 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. In relation to the board composition, 
Table 1 shows that the majority of the board members in listed family firms (75%) are 
independent directors, with family directors representing about 20% of the board 
members. In line with previous studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Amore et al., 2014), 
women are underrepresented on the boards, with only 13% of the total board members 
being female. Following our typology, most of these women are family outsiders, 
accounting for 11% of the total board members. The analyses of correlations show that 
the percentage of woman on a board is positively correlated with CSP. Yet, in line with 
our predictions, the signs and significance of the correlation coefficients change when we 
consider the different roles of the female directors.  
_______________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results of the panel data models to determine the effect of 
female directors and their different respective categories on CSP. In line with our baseline 
assumption, and consistent with previous literature, the influence of female directors in 
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enhancing CSP is confirmed in the case of family firms. Interestingly, Table 2 shows that 
neither non-family insiders nor family outsiders’ directors influence CSP in family firms.  
_____________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
In Table 3, we break down the percentage of female directors based on our proposed 
typology (namely family insider, family outsider, non-family insider and non-family 
outsider). As we hypothesized, the impact of female directors on CSP in family firms 
transcends their gender role. Model 1 shows that in the case of women family directors, 
only those who are also officers in the firm (family insiders) have a (positive) influence 
on the firm’s CSP, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. In contrast, in the case of non-family 
female directors, the positive impact on CSP comes from those who do not possess an 
executive position in the firm (non-family outsiders), providing support to Hypothesis 2.  
______________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Post hoc analyses  
We first distinguish between internal (employees) and external (community) dimensions 
of CSP. Although our theorizing does not foresee a differential impact of our independent 
variables on each social dimension, we acknowledge that they each have unique attributes 
and are therefore worthy of independent scrutiny (Cruz et al, 2014; Wang et al., 2016). 
The results in Table 1 show a strong correlation between the two different dimensions of 
CSP, but also a high standard deviation, indicating that there are significant differences 
within companies in their CSP regarding internal and external stakeholders. As can be 
seen in Table 2, the influence of female directors is significant for both the employees 
and the community dimensions of CSP. When different types of women directors are 
considered (see Models 2 and 3 in Table 3) we still observe the positive influence of 
family insider and non-family outside directors we previously reported for total CSP. 
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These results further confirm hypotheses 1 and 2. Yet, contrary to our expectations, 
female family outsider directors also have a positive effect on the employee dimension of 
CSR. Furthermore, the results confirm the negative effect of family ownership on the 
internal CSP in the case of family firms (Cruz et al., 2014). 
We performed some other additional analyses in order to test the robustness of our results. 
First, we were concerned with the small percentage that all the family female typologies 
represent over the total board size, with the exception of the family outsider category. In 
the absence of multicollinearity problems, this small percentage may explain the large 
beta coefficient that we obtained in some of the regressions. A closer look reveals that 
although there was more than one non-family outsider director in 32% of the firms, this 
percentage falls to 4% in the case of family outsiders, and to 0.6% for family insiders. 
This indicates that the variable that renders family firms different in terms of their boards’ 
gender composition is the presence of at least one female director. 
Consequently, we replicated the analyses for Hypotheses 1 and 2 by using a dummy 
variable that takes the value of “1” if there is “at least one female director of each type” 
(“0”). The results displayed in Table 4 offer further support to both Hypotheses. The 
presence of at least one family insider woman director is enough to positively influence 
a firm’s CSP regarding both dimensions. Also consistent with our expectations, the 
presence of at least one non-family outsider female director positively affects family firm 
CSP, hence these women’s place on the board is legitimized and they hold significant 
power over decision-making. In contrast, and as illustrated in the previous analyses, the 
presence of “at least one non-family insider” and of “at least one family outsider” do not 
play any role in determining the CSP of their firms.  
______________________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
______________________________ 
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The above analyses support our arguments that understanding differences in legitimacy 
and power among the different types of female directors is key to explaining the 
heterogeneity among CSP in family firms. Nevertheless, the observed differences could 
also be due to other factors that distinguish the four categories of women, and which may 
be unrelated to their power and legitimacy in the company. To dismiss alternative 
explanations, we performed additional exploratory analyses at the individual (female 
directors’) level, as opposed to our previous unit of analysis (the firm level).  
First, we analyzed whether there were age differences between women in the four groups, 
since previous research has indicated a generational gap in directors to explain why 
female directors positively impact CSP (Terjesen et al., 2009). Our analyses show that 
this is not the case in our sample, since there are no significant age differences among the 
four categories of female directors. Second, we investigated if these women differed in 
their “CSR background,” i.e. in whether they had previous experience in dealing with 
CSR aspects. In order to do so, we manually inspected the biographies of the female 
directors as shown in the firms’ proxy statements. We concluded that a woman had a CSR 
background if she had been involved in philanthropic activities, foundations or NGOs. 
The differences among the four categories of female directors in relation to their CSR 
background were statistically significant (p<0.01). The proportion of female directors 
with CSR backgrounds was higher among non-family outsiders (58%), while that of 
family insiders with a CSR background was much lower (27%). Hence in the case of 
these women, their inclination towards CSR does not seem to be driven by their 
involvement in CSR activities outside of the family firm.  
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DISCUSSION 
We have corroborated the premise that female directors are central to understanding 
heterogeneity in family firms’ CSP. More importantly, our analyses confirm that female 
directors have widely varying levels of influence on the CSP of family firms. Therefore, 
it seems incorrect to talk about the effect of women per se, at least in the case of family 
firms. Rather, accounting for female directors’ power and legitimacy on boards seems 
warranted in order to make accurate predictions about their actual influence over firms’ 
strategic decisions.  
When the generic effect of women is considered it is unsurprising to find a significant 
(and positive) effect of the proportion of female directors on CSP. Yet, an assessment of 
the impact of the presence of women in the boardroom on CSP in family firms needs to 
acknowledge the relative presence of each category of female directors. Of particular 
importance is the balance between women non-family outsiders and family insiders. Our 
results show that both types of female directors “make a better table,” i.e. greater 
representation of both types enhances CSP in family firms.   
In the case of female non-family outsiders, our findings accord with previous studies in 
non-family contexts that show that female outsider directors are encouraged to support 
CSP (as per their gender role), and have the discretion to do so (as per their role as 
outsiders). The fact that these levels of motivation and discretion do not change with the 
presence of a controlling owner with strong monitoring capacity (including the ability to 
select and dismiss board members) and distinct family goals (some of which are contrary 
to fostering CSP) is interesting. It would appear that family owners value the expertise 
brought by these non-family outsiders, who are empowered to make their voices heard in 
the boardroom even when it contradicts the interests of the family. A different picture 
emerges in the case of family female outsider directors, whose influence on CSP is 
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restricted to the employee dimension. To exert an influence, family female outsider 
directors also need to reach a relatively higher numerical representation on the board. A 
possible explanation for this non-significant result is that family women who do not work 
in the company but occupy board seats are considered token women, with low levels of 
legitimacy and power to affect board decisions. Their directorship may be another sign 
of the family control of the company, and a possible mechanism to reinforce it. 
The fact that both family insider and outsider directors enhance the employee dimension 
of CSP suggests that women family directors “humanize the workplace” (Edlund, 1992) 
in their firms. This positive effect is even more striking given the negative impact that 
(according to our results) both family ownership and the presence of family directors have 
on this particular CSP internal dimension. Family female directors might indeed stick to 
their feminine values when faced with employee-related issues, despite their otherwise 
unwavering commitment to the family’s SEW. Having family women in strategic 
managerial positions signals companies’ commitment to the advancement of gender 
diversity (Burke, 1994). Family female directors are more likely to consider their 
responsibility to address during board meetings issues of gender diversity regarding 
employee recruitment, retention, development, and advancement in organizations, and 
thus act as modest forces for change, with effects on morale as well as the retention of 
managerial women (Burke, 1994). These findings are interesting since most of the scant 
literature on the subject tends to describe women as “fiercely loyal to the family business” 
(Salganicoff, 1990), as their legitimacy within the business is predominantly tied to their 
family role (Martinez-Jimenez, 2009). Given the negative impact of family ownership on 
the employee dimension of CSR, our results suggest that the gender role is more salient 
in terms of decisions regarding the CSP of the firm.  
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This analysis of insider female directors also offers interesting insights to both the 
corporate governance and the family business literature. Very few women hold positions 
in both the executive suite and the corporate boardroom, and family firms do not seem to 
be an exception. However, our results clearly show that the ability of these insider women 
to influence CSP is highly dependent on their family ties. 
Although we did not formulate an explicit hypothesis, since doing so would imply to test 
for a null effect, our results also show that non-family insider female directors do not play 
any role in influencing CSP. These female directors face a dilemma between their gender 
role to support CSR and their position as directors of the family firm. The economic 
impact of CSP is uncertain at best, and according to our results and in line with previous 
research (Cruz et al., 2014), family owners may not necessarily be enthusiastic about 
CSP, especially as regards internal stakeholders. Therefore, to reduce their risk of 
redundancy, non-family insiders may avoid advocating for CSP in the boardroom. These 
women may not only lack motivation to support CSP, but also the discretion to do so. 
This is because family owners are reluctant to empower key executives, to prevent losing 
SEW benefits related to maintaining family control (Cruz et al, 2010).  
Future research 
In this paper we have relied upon corporate governance and family literature to draw 
inferences about the extent to which females hold power and are considered legitimate in 
the boardroom. Future research might benefit from measuring women’s actual power by 
examining, for example, their presence on important committees such as nomination and 
remuneration. This line of research would extend early surveys of women’s presence on 
such committees (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994).  
Researchers should continue to investigate other factors that may accordingly moderate 
the relationship between female directors and the family firm’s CSR. For example, the 
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relationship between female board representation and social behaviors may be more 
positive for family firms that operate in controversial industries. Berrone et al. (2010) 
suggest that in polluting industries, families may be more concerned about their image 
and reputation and consider CSR a critical component of their firm’s strategy. As such, 
board members might be more sensitive to female directors’ pro-social views. In 
particular, female directors with CSR-related expertise might acquire greater expert 
power. As expressed by Finkelstein (1992: 509), expert “power tends to accrue best when 
a manager’s expertise is in an area critical to an organization. Enhanced power may in 
turn strengthen the influence of women’s directors on a family firm’s CSP. 
Similarly, in searching for indicators of female directors’ legitimacy and power, we 
considered personal characteristics such as family ties or of being an outsider. Further 
research examining the other factors that may determine whether and how female 
directors influence social performance, especially those that affect the heterogeneity of 
family firms, is required. 
Although this paper has focused on the influence of female directors on one particular 
aspect where gender makes a difference – CSR – future research could also extend inquiry 
to their impacts on other strategic outcomes. In particular, and given scholars’ interest in 
family firms’ entrepreneurial behavior (e.g. Zellweger, Nason and Nordqvist, 2012), the 
gendered nature of entrepreneurship in general and in family firms in particular (Cruz, 
Justo and De Castro, 2012), research could benefit from investigating female directors’ 
impacts on the entrepreneurial activity of these firms.   
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Table 1: Mean, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations. 
 
Variable Mean S. D. 1  2  3  4  5  6  
  
             
1. Community 48.657 10.175 1                       
2. Employee 50.365 9.701 0.549 *** 1                   
3. CSR 50.246  7.977  0.877 *** 0.8634 *** 1               
4. Family onwership 0.359 0.268 -0.070 + -0.142 *** -0.127 *** 1           
5. Ins. investors 0.188 0.130 -0.107 ** -0.171 *** -0.269 ** 0.019   1       
6. Firm size 8.393 1.354 0.031   0.188 ** 0.125 ** -0.069 + -0.266 *** 1   
7. ROA 0.095 0.074 0.167 *** 0.210 *** 0.279 *** -0.082 + -0.243 *** 0.115 ** 
8. Firm age 40.629 30.180 -0.038   0.071 + -0.004   0.032   0.027   0.008   
9. Age Women  40.629 30.180 0.023   0.005   -0.024   0.015   0.020   -0.025   
10. Tenure Women  57.313 6.876 0.038   -0.017   -0.061   -0.016   -0.054   0.095 * 
11. Indepen. board 0.748 0.116 0.015   0.098 ** 0.083 *** -0.290 *** 0.151 *** -0.008   
12. Family board 0.198 0.111 -0.065 + -0.125 *** -0.179 *** 0.329 *** -0.119 ** -0.181 *** 
13. Women board 0.136 0.100 0.148 *** 0.250 *** 0.198 ** 0.097 ** -0.086 + 0.114 ** 
14. FamilyWomen 
board 
0.022 0.048 -0.073 + 0.013   -0.101 * 0.376 *** -0.089 * -0.041   
15. Independent 
Women board 
0.106 0.089 0.219 *** 0.291 *** 0.288 *** -0.055   -0.089 * 0.185 *** 
16. Other Women  0.008 0.030 -0.033   -0.042   -0.07   -0.141 *** 0.114 ** -0.094 ** 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
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Table 1: Mean, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations (cont.). 
 7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
7. ROA 1                                     
8. Firm age 0.074 * 1                                 
9. Age Women  -0.069 + 0.093 * 1                             
10. Tenure 
Women  
-0.012   0.147 *** 0.408 *** 1                         
11. Indepen. board 0.001   0.137 *** 0.042   -0.013   1                     
12. Family board -0.035   0.119 ** 0.099 * 0.169 *** -0.492 *** 1                 
13. Women board 0.234 *** 0.272 *** 0.017   -0.006   0.101 ** 0.035   1             
14. FamilyWomen 
board 
0.105 *** 0.237 *** -0.023   0.233 *** -0.205 *** 0.463 *** 0.440 ***  1         
15. Independent 
Women board 
0.156 *** 0.178 *** 0.090 * -0.074 + 0.215 *** -0.188 *** 0.828 *** -0.04   1     
16. Other Women  0.152 *** -0.011   -0.139 *** -0.216 *** 0.038   -0.077 * 0.177 *** -0.02   -0.126 *** 1 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
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Table 2. The impact of women directors on CSR  
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
 
  
  CSR   Community 
 
Employee 
 
Family Ownership  -7.704 ** -4.798 
 
-7.839 ** 
Firm Size  1.547 ** 0.575 
 
1.767 *** 
ROA 12.67 * -0.046 * 0.011   
Firm Age  -0.024 
 
16.84 + 9.345   
Family Directors  -6.597 
 
-2.164 
 
-7.142   
independent Directors  4.161 
 
8.337 
 
3.447   
Age Women Directors  0.121 
 
0.159 
 
0.064   
Tenure Women Directors  0.214 + 0.241 
 
0.078   
Women  Directors  18.14 ** 31.97 *** 21.93 ** 
  
     
  
  
     
  
Manufacturing 9.02 *** 2.51 
 
9.51 *** 
Transport, 
communications 
7.91 ** 5.83 
 
8.82 *** 
Wholesalers and retailers 10.34 *** 6.72 + 10.14 *** 
Finance and insurance 2.09 
 
1.80 
 
-0.28   
Services 11.30 *** 6.55 
 
11.74 *** 
  
     
  
Wald 90.50 *** 64.53 *** 73.92 *** 
R squared 0.240 
 
0.13 
 
0.2   
 N obs 416   528             529 
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Table 3. The impact of women directors’ type on CSR  
  CSR 
 
Community 
 
Employee   
Family ownership  -9.811 *** -6.367 * -10.411 *** 
Firm Size  1.657 ** 0.383 
 
1.646 *** 
ROA 12.69 * -0.039 
 
8.925   
Firm Age  -0.024 
 
17.97 
 
0.009   
Family Directors  -9.517 
 
-2.046 
 
-10.96 * 
Independent Directors 5.127 
 
9.807 
 
3.804   
Age Women Directors  0.135 
 
0.149 
 
0.079   
Tenure Women  Directors  0.164 
 
0.173 
 
-0.017   
Family Insider Directors 63.88 ** 67.12 * 54.54 * 
Family outsider Directors  23.89 
 
12.40 
 
42.90 * 
Non-Family Insider Directors  5.102 
 
-2.580 
 
-17.66   
Non-Family Outsider  Directors  16.73 ** 32.55 *** 19.91 ** 
       
  
     
  
Manufacturing 9.125 *** 3.062 
 
9.872 *** 
Transport, communications 7.953 ** 7.182 + 9.215 *** 
Wholesalers and retailers 10.35 *** 6.778 + 10.81 *** 
Finance and insurance 2.465 
 
2.163 
 
0.552   
Services 11.49 *** 7.522 * 12.86 *** 
  
     
  
Wald 105.2 *** 87.40 *** 81.00 *** 
R squared 0.21 
 
0.15 
 
0.21   
 N obs 416   528   529   
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
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Table 4. The effect of having at least one woman director of each type on CSP  
  CSR 
 
Community Employee 
 
Family Ownership  -8.130 *** -4.120 
 
-7.999 ** 
Firm Size  1.743 ** 0.454 
 
1.600 *** 
ROA 14.79 * 21.07 ** 11.08   
Firm Age  -0.018 
 
-0.034 
 
0.012   
Age Women Directors  0.126 
 
0.163 
 
0.044   
Tenure Women  Directors  0.160 
 
0.158 
 
0.046   
Family Directors  -5.142 
 
1.328 
 
-5.691   
independent Directors  6.155 
 
12.20 * 4.381 
 
At least one Women Family insider 4.150 ** 5.638 ** 4.093 * 
At least one Women Family Outsider  0.595 
 
0.553 
 
0.131   
At least one Women Non family 
insider  
1.764 
 
0.320 
 
3.082   
At least one Women Non family 
outsider 
3.171 ** 5.391 ** 5.971 ** 
  
     
  
Manufacturing 9.103 *** 2.999 
 
9.698 ** 
Transport, communications 7.809 ** 6.922 
 
9.470 * 
Wholesalers and retailers 10.83 ** 7.588 + 10.86 * 
Finance and insurance 1.964 
 
2.501 
 
0.528   
Services 11.47 *** 7.425 + 12.56 ** 
  
     
  
  
     
  
  
     
  
Wald  84.04 *** 51.88 *** 59.80 *** 
R2 0.200 
 
0.110 
 
0.190   
Nobs 416   528 
 
529   
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
 
